X-33 & modigression

> The (VentureStar) thing was never more than a money maker for
Lock-Mart and a far-out technology R&D program under the guise of
carrying on the search for SSTO technology started, (much more
effectively & realistically) by McDonnel-Douglas & the BMDO.

Interesting lessons, all of which were violated by Lockheed, with the
predictable effect:
http://www.jerrypournelle.com/slowchange/SPACECOVER.html
(much more in the SSX articles)

X ships aren't prototypes. Build two, fly one until you prang it,
use what you learned to modify the other one, and fly that until you
augur it in or there's nothing more to learn.

The real danger to SSTO is not technological, but organizational. X
programs must be kept small and lean, and while they must be
adequately funded they must not be over funded. Too much money
destroys technological development as surely as too little money.
The ideal X project would be carried out by a small management team
working at a remote base such as Edwards Air Force Base under a
program office that has a limited life span.

The rapid pace and flight-vehicle focus of "X" aircraft programs
keeps lab bench exercises and internal memos from consuming all
resources.... X-aircraft do not have payload or other operational
mission requirements imposed, nor are they engineered for mass
production.
"X" programs by their nature have to be fast and cheap; too much
time or money and they tend to bog down in open-ended pursuit of
perfection, rather than quickly achieving a significant step toward
the ultimate goal. It cannot too often be repeated that X vehicles
are not prototypes.
Typical "X" programs take three to four years, and cost in the low
hundreds of millions. Because they are not prototypes there is and
should be no inherent commitment to a production vehicle followon.